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Shahrough Akhavi
SUNNI

MODERNIST THEORIES OF SOCIAL
CONTRACT IN CONTEMPORARY
EGYPT

Although social-contracttheorists differ on a numberof points, they concur that human beings choose to form associationsto promotetheir interests.An importantcorollary is that tension exists between the individual'sinherentindependenceand freedom
and the authorityto which she or he must submit to achieve compliance with the
goals of the contract.Occasionally,a theorist discusses God in the overall scheme of
things, but the conception is deistic, so that the God who created the world does not
intervenein its operation.For the rest, contractariantheories privilege naturallaw and
naturalrights, according to which the individual is treated as a social being who is
fully rational, free, and independent.Fundamentally,three steps are taken in the process of making the social contract: (1) creating society; (2) creating the sovereign
state; (3) dischargingobligations and enjoying benefits.
Because mainstreamAsh'ari Sunni Islam views God as continuouslyinterveningin
the operationof the universe and insists on the human being's "acquisition"of his or
her actions from such a God, it did not generate a theory of social contract.1The
theory was introducedin the 19th centuryas a convention to the Muslim world, when
reformerssuch as the EgyptianAzharite scholarRifa'ahRafi' al-Tahtawi(d. 1873) and
the Young OttomanwriterNamik Kemal (d. 1888) became interestedin contractarian
theorists.2This is not to say that Muslim traditionslack ideas and concepts that are
importantto the elaborationof a theory of social contract,such as justice, obligation,
mutuality,and interests.3But, before the 19th century,jurists would not have referred
to individualMuslims ceding their discrete intereststo the communityas a whole and
converting them into a collective interest for which that community would be the
trustee.
ContemporaryEgyptianmodernistMuslim thinkersare raising critical issues about
political community. The rational, generally non-polemical basis of their discourse
requiresthat their argumentsbe taken into account. Their writing variously deals with
such concepts as representation,interests, organization,obligation, authority,justice,
sovereignty,and leadership.Despite the seriousness of their motivationsand commitment, their theoreticalargumentssuffer from an importantflaw because of the ad hoc
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manner in which they incorporatepropositionsabout the concepts mentioned earlier
in their effort to constructa theory of social contract.They are forced into this by an
assumptionthat, in Islam, naturallaw is to be equatedwith divine law but then ignore
the implications of this for autonomous social action by individual Muslims in constructingand consolidatingpolitical community.
MAINSTREAM

NON-MODERNIST

SUNNI

NOTIONS

OF CONTRACT

In the Qur'an,a numberof words appearthat have the connotationof contract.These
include 'ahd,4caqd,5bayc,'mawthiq,7and mrthaq.8The Prophetand the believers must
have understoodthem in the linguistic frameworksand contexts that were then current. Although it is impossible to know for certain what constitutedthe contemporary
understandingsof these terms, it is unlikely that they were understoodas betokening
social contract.
According to Ash'ari non-modernistSunnism, God had sent prophets to various
peoples and made covenants with them, which they have brokenfor various reasons.
Pained, God made a final effort to those who agreed to submit, choosing Muhammad
as His Prophet. The Muslims passively accepted, knowing they would benefit from
revelationalknowledge as well as from God's offer of the Earth's resources to them
as His vicegerents.
The Prophet'spart in this "single contract"was to articulatethe message and persuade people to accept it. Muslims differ as to whetherthe Prophet'srole went beyond
proselytizingto include political leadership,althoughall recognize his actual rule. The
question is whetherthis rule stemmed from his divine office as Prophetor from deliberate choice of believers, who viewed him as best qualified. Over the centuries,nonmodernist Sunni mainstreaminterpretationssupport the first argument,whereas the
modernistsemphasize the second.
As a merchant,the Prophetknew the importanceof contracts,and as an arbiterof
disputes and initiatorof tribalalliances he gained importantlegal and political experience. But these compacts were not social contracts, which are formed when "each
man, by right of nature, that is, by right of his human character.., possessed the
quality of freedom."9 This sort of individualism was precluded by tribal society's
collective ethos. Ash'arismholds that God ordainedthe Prophet'srule, promisingbenefits to the people who accepted. This differs from people independentlyand freely
creating a community to protect their interests. Muslims may accept or reject the
revelation, but they may not negotiate or renegotiatethe covenant.
If the Qur'anand Sunna do not vouchsafe social contracts, what about consensus,
or ijmd'?Given the immense corpus of opinions issued by jurists over the centuries,
it would be very difficult to generate a unified theory of contracts that would accurately reflect all their views. However, one can state the following: (1) contractsare
among the most important areas of concern of the jurists; (2) they cover personal
status (marriage,inheritance,divorce, guardianship),commerce (transactionsto buy
and sell, partnerships,leases on property), torts (civil wrongs), and political pacts
(such as in early Islam when an Arab Muslim tribe provided the status of "client"
[mawld] to non-Arab converts to Islam); (3) Ash'arism's view of natural law is to
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equate it to God's law and to make God the determinantof human behavior; (4) the
premise of the jurists' rulings on these contractualissues is that the interest of the
believer qua believer is paramount,and that requirementsof community morality are
best served when the believer's devotion to God is secured;(5) the idea of an independent individualfreely disposing of his or her will in response to the dictates of reason
for the defense of his or her interestsby enteringinto a civil union is alien to juristic
rulings. Ash'arismdenies that human beings voluntarily entrust some of their rights
and interests to society and its state, which are merely custodians of these and must
return them to them upon their demand; (6) God's role as initiator of all contracts
with the believers can be seen in the Qur'anicverse 4:58: "God commands you to
return trusts to their owners." Such trusts include the holy law, knowledge broadly
conceived, and all the Earth's material resources, which God made available to the
believers. God is the trustorin this tradition,not the people. Should they fail to render
up these trusts to God, He may take them back, as stated in Qur'an3:26: "You give
whom it pleases You the kingdom, and You take away the power from whomsoever
You will"; and (7) Constitutionaltheorists in the l1th-13th centuries elaboratedthe
qualificationsof leaders (caliphs) and discussed the relationshipbetween these leaders
and the Muslims in the context of fulfilling religious, not worldly, obligations and
rights.
With the Prophet'sdeath, a "doublecontract"came into force in the Ashcariview.10
In addition to the original contract between God and the believers came a second
contractin which the leaders of the communityidentified one of themselves to administer the law. This caliph could not promulgatenew law, but he retainedthe Prophet's
function of implementingexisting law.
Over the centuries, most Muslim writers have characterizedthe second contract
as being founded on popular choice, basing their argumentson works by medieval
constitutionalisttheorists such as al-Mawardi(d. 1058). This claim of "popularelection" became particularlyprominentin the writings of Muslims in the 19th century
and thereafter,as Europeantheories of social contractbegan to be known. However,
the early caliphs were chosen not by the people but by the close companions of the
Prophet. Moreover, with Umayyad dynastic rule (661-749/50), whatever "popular"
element putativelyhad existed in the first twenty-nineyears of Islam vanished. Meanwhile, although the constitutional scholars implied or stated the right to replace an
unjust caliph, their greater concern was over possible chaos that disobedience to a
ruler might unleash, making it impossible to fulfill the devotional obligations. Hence,
their writings had a strongly apologetic cast, and this overrode their weakly stated
argumentsthat sinning rulersneed not be obeyed. At any rate, they establishedneither
a thresholdof oppression nor a procedureto oust a derelict leader.
Conditionsin the post-ReformationWest seemed more favorableto social-contract
thought. Christ'sstatement,"Renderunto Caesarthat which is Caesar'sand unto God
that which is God's," and St. Paul's injunction, "Let every soul be subject to the
highest powers," which equatedobedience to magistrateswith obedience to God (Romans 13:1-7), were hardly conducive to contractarianideas. But matters were to
change. St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) asserted the people's right to determine the
form of government,to authorizeindividualrulers,and to revoke the rule. In addition,
the system of feudalism itself was based on notions of contractuallybased mutual
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obligations and rights in relations among lords, vassals, and villeins. Finally, considerations of natural law were important for the emergence of Western social-contract
theory. The theory arose on the belief, as Cicero stated it, that "thereis in fact a true
law, namely right reason, which is in accordancewith nature,applies to all men and
is unchangeableand eternal."If there is such a naturallaw, then there must be natural
rights associated with such a law. As ErnestBarkerputs it, "if there were any limitations imposed on naturalrights, those limitationsmust be due to a voluntarycontract
made by the possessors of such rights.""11
The conception of natural law here is that the operation of the universe exists
independently of the will of God. Even if, as with Aquinas, the creation is due to
God's will, it is maintainedthat God neverthelessthereuponrefrainedfrom interfering
in its dynamics. This is quite differentfrom Ash'ariteperspectives,which stress God's
immanencein nature,whereby all developmentresults from God's recurringintervention to bring about each individual action.
Under the influence of Europeancontact with the Muslim world after the French
Revolution, Muslim interest in contractstook a somewhat different slant. Now it was
deemed importantsomehow to integratethe traditionalview on contractsas covenants
offered by God to a people passively accepting it, supplementedby the secondary
contract made by the leaders of the community among themselves to choose a supreme leader, with contractsas social conventions stressing the free will of people to
manage their own affairs.
WESTERN

THEORIES

OF SOCIAL

CONTRACT

No single Western theory of social contract exists. Differences inhere over objectives-to create a society, a civil society, a government,distributivejustice, or morality; over the identity of the contractingparties-individuals making agreementswith
other individuals, each individual making a compact with the ruler, the people as a
whole, or towns, or corporationsmaking agreements with rulers; and over motivations-personal security, religious impetuses, economic well-being, and moral improvementmore generally.
The leading thinkersof social contracttheory in the West were Thomas Hobbes (d.
1679), John Locke (d. 1704), Jean-JacquesRousseau (d. 1778), and ImmanuelKant
(d. 1804). Hobbes believed that the state of naturewas lawless because it was impossible to find in it any criteria of right and wrong that could be enforced. People are
naturallyaggressive and acquisitive, because of either human psychodynamicsor instinctive territorialurges. Because no security could be established in the state of
naturetypified by "the war of all against all," humansagreed to surrendertheir autonomy and freedom entirely to an absolute ruler,who in returnwould guaranteeorder.
Hobbes seemed to suggest that once this surrenderoccurred,it was final. Althoughit
may appearthat Hobbes based his theory of social contracton emotion (fear of death),
it is in fact founded on a rational calculation of the relative benefits accruing on
abandoningthe state of nature.
Locke, by contrast, emphasized that the state of nature was indeed regulated by
naturallaw. He wrote that people are the propertiesof God who had a duty to protect
their own lives and possessions, lest harm befall God's interests. God has chargedus
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with certain duties that we find increasinglydifficult to implementin a state of nature
because no final authorityexists to which we can appeal in the event that our efforts
to dischargethem are challenged. Locke held that people have an entitlementto their
lives and property, which he considered an extension of that life. Every person is
naturallyfree, equal, and independent,which seems incompatiblewith the earlieridea
of God's ownership of them, but Locke's deism explains the apparentcontradiction.
Human insecurity thus was due not to the absence of law but to the inability to
enforce these entitlements. A contract establishing government and laying out the
specific terms by which the people's lives and propertywere to be protectedwas the
result. Instead of Hobbes's situationof individualspre-emptively strikingtheir neighbors in an effort to promotetheir security,people in Locke's version rationallyrecognize one another'sentitlementsto life and propertyand set limits on them. The legislature in particularplays a prominentrole in Locke's theory,mainly exercising what he
termed a "fiduciarypower to act for certain ends,"'2 which was subject to alteration
by the people. In short, Locke held that if the government fails in its fiduciary endeavor, because of willful malevolence or neglect, the people may change it.
Rousseau believed that, in the state of nature, human beings were free but dominated by their animal natures and low level of rational and moral development. Although life was not perpetual warfare, human beings lived doltishly, and eventually
"the obstacles to continuing in a state of naturewere strongerthan the forces which
each individualcould employ to the end of continuing in it."'3At this particularmoment, each individualhumanbeing separatelymade a reciprocalcommitmentwith the
sovereign (not with other individuals)that delivered him or her from loutish lethargy
and vested him or her with morality.Thus, the social contractis a means for converting the human being from a dullardto the creaturethat God intended him or her to
be and that the ancient Greek philosophersbelieved was his or her ultimate destiny.
Or, as Rousseau put it, "What a man loses as a result of the Social Contractis his
naturalliberty and his unqualifiedright to lay hands on all that tempts him, provided
only that he can compass its possession. What he gains is civil liberty and the ownership of what belongs to him."'4
The naturalfreedom of the individual is consolidated into the general will of the
community,a whole that is greaterthan the sum of its parts. Submission to the general
will representsthe emancipationof the humanbeing ratherthan abject subordination.
States are despotic if they are not instrumentsof this general will. The latter is a
metaphorwhereby even though each individualenteringthe social contractsurrenders
his or her natural liberty to gain civil liberty, this individual does not control the
general will, which has the status of corporateor legal personality and may have to
be articulatedby the single legislator. Indeed, the legislator may have to educate the
members of the society as to where their true interests lie. But this is not a problem
for Rousseau, because the human being alienates his rights to the whole community
ratherthan to a tyrannicalstate: "[w]hoso gives himself to all gives himself to none."•5
Kant contributedto social-contracttheory by addressingRousseau's famous question about how to reconcile natural rights and natural freedom with submission to
authority.Hobbes answeredthis question on grounds of prudence:the capacity of the
individualin the state of natureto issue laws is not much of a virtue if that individual
is continually in danger of being killed. Thus, Hobbes held that human beings will
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join a commonwealthdespite total loss of this legislative function. Kant was clear in
his own mind about the moral obligation of human beings to enter into community.
He was, however, botheredby the potential loss of moral autonomyonce they did so.
His solution to the problem was to suggest that autonomy and authority were not
mutuallyinconsistent, and he maintainedthat only in a communitywas justice possible. In the state of nature,the freedom that people possessed was lawless and could
be actualized-in the form of legislation advancingthe interests of the self-only in
a civil society.16
SALAFI

MODERNIST

CONSIDERATIONS

Serif Mardinhas studied how Young Ottomanreformersstruggledto create a synthesis of elements of these Westerntheories of social contract with Islamic revelation.17
He concludes that they ultimately failed because Western theories of representation,
interests, and rule were rooted in a lay, not a revelational, theory of ethics. The lay
theory of ethics featureda theory of naturallaw that emphasizedthe autonomy of the
individual as a reasoning being whose very reason entitled him to certain natural
rights. Muslim revelation,by contrast,promoteda theory of the law of naturein which
God was the authorof creation and a continuously interveningelement in its evolution. Still, these early efforts generatedan importantreform movement, the salafiyya,
whose leaders sought to succeed where the Young Ottomansfell short.
The Salafi leaders were Muhammad 'Abduh and his disciples, including Qasim
Amin (d. 1908), Rashid Rida (d. 1935), Mustafa'Abd al-Raziq (d. 1947), Muhammad
Husayn Haykal (d. 1956), Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid (d. 1963), and 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq
(d. 1966).8 Other writers, while lacking in originality, have also been influential in
spreadingSalafi ideas, such as KhalidMuhammadKhalid (at least until his recantation
in 1980 of his earlier ideas).
Salafi objectives were to reformIslam and returnit to its believed original condition
at the time of the early Muslim community,to revivify the Arabic language, and to
promote the interests of the Islamic community by reconciling reason and science
with revelation. 'Abduh and Rida-the most importantof the Salafi thinkers-were
heavily influenced by the conservative reformism of the medieval jurists al-Ghazali
(d. 1111), Ibn Taymiyyah(d. 1328), and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawiyyah(d. 1350). Attacking
blind imitation (taqltd) and the pedantry of the formalistic theologians, the Salafi
leaders advanced the cause of independentjudgment (ijtihad) that would achieve a
new consensus that rested on authentic Islamic principles and that could addressthe
modem problems faced by Muslims. As noted earlier, 'Abduh and Rida raised the
general good and public interest(maslaha) to the level of importantjuristic concepts,
rescuing them from centuries of marginalization in Islamic jurisprudence. They
strongly opposed secularization,although others in this tradition,including 'Ali CAbd
al-Raziq, Lutfi al-Sayyid, and KhalidMuhammadKhalid (until 1980) sought to separate religion and politics.
'Abduhbelieved thatthe startingpoint for reconciling Islamic belief and the requirements of a modern social order was the education of the people. He tried to counter
the division of Egyptian society into two parts-one "always diminishing, in which
the laws and moral principles of Islam ruled, and the other, always growing, in which
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principles derived by human reason from considerations of worldly utility hold
sway."'9Because cAbduh'sown intellectual roots lay in Islamic tradition,he was not
an advocateof democracyor constitutionalrule in themselves. In fact, if constitutional
rule hinderedthe process of educating the people, he considered it retrograde,and if
a benevolent despotism facilitated it, he believed it should be tolerated,although it is
true that he held that Muslims were entitled to remove an iniquitous ruler.
Malcolm Kerrnotes that "consistency,clarity,depth, and sustainedintellectualcommitment.., .were not the qualities for which 'Abduhwas noted."20But had he chosen
to persevere in these qualities, he is likely to have alienated the conservative Islamic
establishmentin Egypt, something his project could not permithim to do. Despite his
prudence,'Abduh implied that Islamic rationalism, long suppressed, deserved to be
resuscitated.
cAbduh,who read French and traveled to France, was most influenced by Auguste
Comte (d. 1857) among the Europeans. Although he was a positivist, Comte had
warned against attemptsto impose a secular rational order, which he felt threatened
society because it abetted "the restless spirit of individualreason, always questioning,
Instead, Comte advocatedtying the questioning spiritto the moral
always doubting."21
truthsof revelation. 'Abduhendorsedthis perspective, but what was the correct interpretation of Islam? Definitely not the scholasticism of the seminaries, which he
deemed incapable of applying rationalanalysis to modern social problems.
'Abduh'sfamous studentRashid Rida paid more attentionthan his illustriousmentor
to mattersrelevantto social contractand politics. Rida arguedthat the Islamic community's sovereignty is manifested in the elite, which the sources termed "the people of
loosing and binding"(ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd). Although he fails to specify who these
people are, Rida identifies them as the community's leaders and those of prominent
rank whom the believers trust. According to Rida, the Muslims, having accepted
God's covenant, have endowed the people of loosing and binding with the authority
to nominate the head of that community, provided the believers are consulted and
allowed to ratify the elite's choice. Kerr notes that Rida identifies the people of loosing and binding with the whole Muslim community (jamd•a),seeing them as its representatives. In this, Rida relies on the medieval commentaryof al-Taftazani(d. 1389)
on the writings of Fakhral-Din al-Razi (d. 1209).22 Hence, Rida bestows community
sovereignty on a poorly identified elite, which Kerr rightly maintainsis unacceptable
for two reasons. First, Rida seems to be saying tautologically that authoritydevolves
on those who have it or are able to exercise it, "which is anotherway of saying that
might makes right."23And second, the people of loosing and binding would appearto
be a semi-closed elite to whom the Muslims as a whole must submit-they are not
delegates of the Muslims but a group whose members "seemingly enjoy their status
by virtue of what is assumed to be an undeniable and absolute capacity.... Their
authoritythen appearsto be in the natureof an oligarchy ratherthan a kind of publicly
exercised sovereignty."24
Based on these considerations, one cannot consider Rida an advocate of Muslim
popularparticipationand choice, putatively exercising social-contractarianrights. We
still have a long way to go to demonstratethat the oath of allegiance to the ruleris in
the natureof a Lockean or Rousseauansocial contract.
Of the Salafi thinkers, it is 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq who came closest to contractarian
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thought. He held that God offered His covenant to the believers, and they joined His
community to implement their religious obligations. But he then maintainedthat the
Prophet'ssuccessors established the caliphate not as a result of doctrinalnecessity or
divine ordainmentbut in response to historically contingent factors. Muslims, he argued, like any humanbeings, possess naturalrights and reason, which permitthem to
act in accordancewith their own calculus of what is best for themselves. This being
so, Muslims do not have to model their government on the historical caliphate but
may establish any form of governmentthey wish. The Prophet himself was solely a
religious leaderwho left it up to each new generationof Muslims to decide this matter.
However, opposition to, ratherthan endorsementof, 'Abd al-Raziq's argumentthat
Islam is religion but not politics is more characteristicof the writings of more recent
Neo-Salafi writers-for example, the criticisms of 'Abd al-Raziq by the prolific indeMore importantfor present purposes is Tariq
pendent scholar Muhammad'Imarah.25
al-Bishri'srejectionof 'Abd al-Raziq'sargumentfor separation,a rejectionthat closely
follows 'Imarah's.26
NEO-SALAFI
LATE 20TH-CENTURY
ON SOCIAL CONTRACT

MODERNIST

THINKING

It is time to ask whether more recent Muslim social theories have fared any better
than their 19th- and early-20th-centurypredecessorsin achieving the synthesis of lay
and religious ethics. I will analyze the thoughtof three EgyptianSunni liberal modernists: Muhammad Ahmad Khalaf Allah (d. 1983), Tariq al-Bishri, and Fahmi Huwaydi.27There is a certain logic in takingthese three as standardbearersfor modernist
Sunni social thought. All of them strongly endorse the use of ijtihad-independent
judgment to determine a ruling of law. They are all preparedto lay aside scriptural
texts when they believe literal interpretationwill hamper the interests of Muslims
today, citing the precedents set by the second caliph in this connection. They speak
to a broad audience and have been active in scholarly and popularforums in disseminating their views. None is a marginalfigure in the Neo-Salafi movement, and each
has avoided polemics that would alienatehim from mainstreamconservativeand modernist circles. They all have had solid connections to the religious institutionin Egypt,
as well as to the governmentand state.
Among contemporaryEgyptian writersKhalaf Allah is unusually specific in trying
to integrateinto contemporarythoughtthe concept of maslaha 'amma(public interest),
which is critical to social-contracttheory.Bishri merits attentionbecause he explicitly
grounds his thought, no matter how diffusely, initially in a realist and later in an
idealist philosophy of history, with implications for social-contractthinking. Finally,
Huwaydi's analysis of democracy in the context of political parties and pluralism
lends itself to several dimensions of social-contracttheory that are associated with the
operationof social communities and that other thinkerstend to ignore.
Bishri is considered by Egyptians as one of Egypt's most importantcontemporary
intellectuals. His work, as LeonardBinder notes, is "widely respected"and "has attracteda good deal of political interest,including that of the Egyptiangovernment."28
He is importantenough that, when the Neo-Salafi journal al-Manar al-Jadid commenced publicationin 1998, he was invited to contributean article to its initial issue.
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Bishri is a conservative modernist advocate of national unity, Islamic authenticity,
Egyptian independence, and cultural autonomy, and his ideas enjoy credibilityalthough more liberal Muslim thinkersof course do not agree with all that he says.
Khalaf Allah representsthe Nasserist legacy. His theoreticalposition can be said to
reflect the most liberal modernistMuslim perspective;hence, he stands as a counter
to Bishri. At the same time, his Islamic credentials are hard for the conservatives to
undermine, because his work is replete with analyses of Qur'anicverses, which in
turn are anchoredin the interpretationsof Muhammad'Abduh.Even though the logic
of his argumentis to separatereligion and politics in the tradition of 'Ali 'Abd alRaziq, he does not advocate this explicitly.
Huwaydi is a popularizerof the Muslim modernistposition. Although he is a journalist, he is inclined toward scholarly analysis. As with Bishri and Khalaf Allah,
Huwaydi commandsthe respect of most membersof the modernistschool. He is more
liberal than Bishri in his willingness to borrow from the Western cultural tradition,
but this willingness is expressed within the classical formulationthat that which is
borrowed cannot be allowed to underminecentral Muslim beliefs. Huwaydi has instantrecognitionin the Muslim world beyond Egypt, somethingthat Khalaf Allah and
perhapseven Bishri cannotmatch. The reason for this is his journalisticactivity,which
includes not only his religion column in al-Ahrambut also his participationin countless roundtables, symposia, and seminarsthoroughoutthe Muslim world. At the same
time, Huwaydi is an articulate spokesman of the modernist perspective and forthrightly advocates institutionalpluralism,which is relevant for social-contracttheory.
These thinkers have been writing at a time of social uncertainty in Egypt. The
country's disastrousdefeat in the June 1967 war is the key backgrounddevelopment
for the resurgence of Islamist movements, some of them violent in orientation,that
generally have expressed hostility towardmore tolerantIslamic currents.In the more
than thirty years since Gamal Abdel Nasser's death, his two successors have moved
away from his secular socialist policies, including Pan-Arabismabroad.This has entailed privatizationof the economy and the removal of the social safety net that Nasser's system established to cushion the shocks of rapid social change. In foreign policy, it has meant the conversion of Egypt into a client of the United States and a cold
peace with Israel. Each of these developmentshas antagonizedimportantsegments of
the population,which see in them a systematic betrayalof Islamic values.
During this period, Egypt has continuedto suffer major social dislocations, including high population growth and obvious income-distributionskews, which have become more pronouncedwith every passing year; deteriorationof infrastructure;increasingly burdensome bureaucratizationof power; mounting corruption in state
administrationand economic sectors; and sharpeningclass cleavages and conflicts as
a consequence of the regime's austeritymeasures, designed to meet demands by the
InternationalMonetary Fund and World Bank to devalue the currency, eliminate
waste, and improve the investment climate. Society has witnessed armed clashes between state security forces and Islamist groups intent on uprootingpositive law, which
is considered a legacy imposed by the West, and substitutingIslamic holy law in its
place.29
Incidents of violence have waxed and waned during these years, but Muslim modernists have become increasingly concerned about alienation of the population from
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the state (for its seeming sellout of religious values) and from public expression of
religious belief (on grounds that religious values seem to have been appropriatedby
violence-prone groups alleging to speak for the "true"Islam). This, then, forms the
social context within which Neo-Salafi reformists have been seeking to reconstruct
community solidarity.In a series of works writtenover the past three decades, Khalaf
Allah, Bishri, and Huwaydi-staunch Neo-Salafis-have chosen to articulate that
movement's paradigmto uphold a liberal Islamic perspective against the claims of
both secularistsand radical Islamist challengers.
MuhammadAhmadKhalaf Allah
As a student, Khalaf Allah specialized in the literatureof the Qur'an.He graduated
from the Dar al-'Ulum and was influenced by the famous Shaykh Amin al-Khuli. He
also earned a bachelor and master's degrees in philosophy at the University of London. He was a strong nationalist and supporterof Nasser and served as the director
of the Institute for Arabic Research and Studies from 1965 to 1983. After Nasser's
death, Khalaf Allah affiliated with the Party of the UnitaryNational ProgressiveBloc
(Tajammu')and became the secretaryof its political-affairscommittee.3:
Khalaf Allah accepts the Ash'ari view that God summoned the believers to accept
His message, grantingthem in returnuse of the Earth'sresources. God's initiative in
creating His community is seen in Qur'an8:62-63: "It is He who has strengthened
you [Muhammad]with His help and with believers whose hearts he cemented with
love."" Divine love, then, becomes God's motive that leads the people to enter into a
contract with Him and create a new society. However, Khalaf Allah mainly focuses
on what occurs once the new society is established. He is particularlyinterestedin
the idea of the state, including the motive behind its establishment.
At one point, Khalaf Allah asserts that God ordains it, citing Qur'an2:247 ("God
gives authorityto whomsoever He wills") and 3:26 ("You give whom it pleases You
the kingdom and take away the power from whomsoever You will").32Elsewhere,
though, he holds that Muslims established the institutionof rule as a matter of reason." On this view, the imamate was requirednot by the holy law but by the fact that
it is rationalfor humanbeings to submitto a leaderwho preventsabuses and arbitrates
their disputes. I take this to be his general position, as can be seen in the following
quote: "the development of human thought guided human reason to the theory of
natural rights emanating from human nature and social life, to the effect that the
They are the authorsof their own progress,35
people are the source of all authority."34
and each member of the community takes full responsibility for his or her actions,
based on reason.36
Khalaf Allah says that each of the first four caliphs was chosen in a different
manner,which shows that the form of government in Muslim societies is subject to
debate and historical contingencies. No invariantblueprintexists for an Islamic state
and government. The only givens are devotional matters ('ibadat) pertaining to the
absolute unity of God, the finality of Muhammad'sprophecy, the Day of Judgment,
and communalexpression of belief in these principles,including the statementof the
credo, prayer, alms-giving, Ramadan fasting, and pilgrimage to Mecca. The daily
affairs of the people are considered social relations (mu'amalat), and these are ar-
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ranged according to the constraints of circumstances. Muslims no longer choose a
caliph by the decision of one, three, or five people, but elect a governmentby means
of an articulatedpublic opinion and a national electorate.37
In his opinion, the Qur'anmandatedaccountable government in the consultation
verses. These verses-42:38 ("Theiraffairs are a matterof counsel") and 3:159 ("So
consult them in affairs")-are actually warrants for heeding the collective "public
opinion"of society. These verses requirethat "opinionin public mattersbe collective,
not individual."38
The Prophet'srole was to assist in the articulationof public opinion:
"It was necessary for the Prophet... to clarify to the people the practicalmeaning of
this verse, 3:159: so consult them in affairs,and accustomthem on how to form public
opinion and to take decisions bearing on public matters."39
The dynamic influencing the state and its government is, in Khalaf Allah's view,
"the public interest and the public good" (maslaha 'amma and khayr 'amm),40 terms

which he does not define but unhesitatingly applies anachronisticallyto the early
Islamic period. In the modern era, he holds, the separation of powers is the chief
means of securing the public interest and public good. No Qur'anicbasis for this is
necessary because, as he has already noted, the Prophet left social matters to the
devising of each Muslim generation.Thus, the basis of contemporarypolitical systems
is "humaninterests and the public good."41 Because he has already referred to the
human being's "naturalrights emanating from human nature,"a fair reading of his
view of the state is that it is the propertyof freely disposing individuals.In this regard,
he interpretsQur'an3:159 as God actually commandingthe Prophetto acknowledge
that the people create their own history.42
The governmentthat the people establish is to be accountableto them. Although in
early Islam those to be consulted were the Prophet'scompanions,termedin the Qur'an
"those in authorityamong you" and by the early commentators"thepeople who loose
and bind," in the modem period they include economic, political, and social elites.
He approvingly cites 'Abduh on this point. Both government and people can freely
borrow non-Islamic laws if they do not contravene the core beliefs. After all, early
jurists adopted aspects of Greek, Roman, Persian, Assyrian, and Babylonian law in
regardto administration,finance, and the dispensationof justice. Moreover, the early
jurists clearly never intended that their opinions on such secular matters be final.
Hence, contemporaryIslamist calls for establishing the shari'acan only mean a demand to observe the devotional duties.43Because the shari'ais constantly changing in
the realm of social relations, later generationscan use their own discretion in arranging them.44
In doing so, they are led by their representatives.These special people, already
referredto as "those in authorityamong you [or] them,"are the subject of two important Qur'anicverses: 4:59 and 4:83. In 4:59, God commands believers to obey Him,
His Prophet,and "those in authorityamong you." In 4:83, God laments the fact that
people waste their time in idle speculation when receiving news about war or peace
affecting the community.He admonishesthem to take such news to "thosein authority
among them," who will be able to check and scrutinizethe news and authenticateor
These people are,
reject its veracity and interpretits significance for the community.45
however, mere mortals and cannot make ex cathedrastatementsof final import about
critical mattersaffecting the people's secular affairs.
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Khalaf Allah finds the strongest scripturalwarrantfor the establishment of nonreligious authorityamong the believers in 3:104: "So let there be among you [believers] a body [umma] that may call to the good, enjoin what is beneficial and forbid
what is evil."46He acknowledges the great 'Abduh's commentaryon this verse that
establishing such a body is a categorical imperative (far4 'ayn) incumbent on every
believer. He also raises the issue of accountabilityof this body to the general population that, in his opinion, elects it. The people as voters exercise oversight and dominion over this body. In the event that it falls short, the believers will replace it.47One
must note that Khalaf Allah's idea that Qur'an3:104 is a warrantfor an accountable
elected legislaturethat calls for good and prohibitsevil is a radicalmodernistinterpretation that is unrecognizableto most commentators.After all, the verse was revealed
in referenceto a merciful God steppingin to separatewarringcombatantsand convert
them into a whole community of believers.
Khalaf Allah notes that nothing in the Prophet's sunna details the nature of the
state. There are, however, traditionsattributedto him that indicate that he wanted to
leave these specifics to later Muslims. This is also in keeping with God's intent in the
Qur'an,which avoids details of this sort.48What the Qur'andoes specify is the end or
the purpose of the state that the Muslims establish, and that is the public good, which
Khalaf Allah equates with the distributionof wealth.49
As for whetherthe human being is fully autonomousin participatingin these processes, Khalaf Allah declares, "Thereis no doubt that God has guided us to the most
preferable and complete foundations and principles upon which we are to build our
governmentand establish our state. He entrustedto us this establishmentby giving us
in this regardfull freedom and complete independencein our daily affairs and social
interests.""'This conforms to his deistic vision in which God is the creatorbut leaves
the operationof His creation to humans.
Oddly, in view of what he has said about the full autonomy of the believers to
organize their politics as they see fit, Khalaf Allah claims that God chose Muhammad
to be both the Prophetof the believers and the head of the first Islamic state."5He did
not need to take this position. He could have arguedinstead that the people chose the
Prophetfor this office because of their conviction that he was the best person for the
job, not because he should be ex officio because of his role as religious messenger.
Noting that Qur'an4:58 specifies that "God commandsyou to returntrusts to their
owners,"KhalafAllah thence proceeds to inquireinto the natureof such trusts, identifying them as security, tranquillityof the soul, and absence of fear. A trust is given
over to a trustee who deposits it for safe-keeping and, in doing so, creates a bond
with the trustor.There are three kinds of trusts:that which the humanbeing has with
God, that with anotherhuman being, and that with himself. The governmentreceives
the trust of the people, and its officials discharge their duties in fulfillment of this
trust.52Unfortunately,Khalaf Allah does not dwell on this topic, averting thereby any
discussion of the contradictionbetween the free disposition of the people and God's
entitlement to all trusts. He seems to believe that a state and its government belong
in practice to the believers, who make it available to officials, and it is the officials'
task to implementpolicies based on the interests of the community.He declares that
"rule" (al-hukm) in Islam belongs to the nation (li al-umma).53This is a view of
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contract that differs markedly from the position adopted by the militant Islamist
groups, which assert that the rule belongs only to God.
Like many modernists,Khalaf Allah berates those who interpretvarious verses of
the Qur'an(5:44, 5:45, 5:47, 12:47, and 12:60) to mean that God is a continuous,
permanentsovereign intervenerin the secular affairs of believers. He carefully provides a contextualanalysis of these verses to conclude that it is the people themselves
(al-nds, al-sha'b) who dispose of their daily affairs.54They do so initially as members
of the Islamic community (ummaislamiyya), but in the modernperiod they constitute
a body politic, forming a nationalcommunity(ummaqawmiyya),united by where they
live, their language, their "common interests,"and their common history. Crucially,
regardless of the historical era, he is absolutely clear that the individual members
of these collectivities are freely disposing of their affairs as human beings and not
automaticallyrespondingto direct or indirectdivine commands."In fact, in one place
he seems to suggest that the revelation itself was a response to the need of the Arabs
to make progress. The content of the message of the Qur'an,on this view, was a
demandfor Arab society to create radical changes in the Arabs' views, beliefs, traditions, customs, moral values, and standardsof behavior.56
Tariq al-Bishri

A Marxist-influencednationalistin the Nasser years, Bishri has filled top positions in
Egypt's legal system. Since 1998, he has been first deputy chair of the Council of
State (Majlis al-Dawla), an organ modeled after the French Conseil d'Etat, which
representsthe country'shighest jurisdictionin mattersof public administration.Bishri's grandfatherserved as Shaykh al-Azhar,so he has strong connections to the country's official religious institution.He believes that one must treat Islam as a historical
phenomenon,examining it in terms not of ideal types but of institutionsand processes
shapedby the actual conditions of the Muslims in any given historical era.
Today, Bishri is one of the leading interpretersof conservative modernism. Although he upholds independentjudgment as critical for adaptingto changing circumstances, Roel Meijer is essentially correct in saying that virtually every institutionor
In this sense, Bishri is
social force that Bishri regardsas authenticis "hierarchical."57
more conservative than Khalaf Allah. Since the October war of 1973, Bishri's focus
has drifted away from secular historical analysis and become increasingly abstract.
His message is a call for Egyptian unity but retains a diffuse commitmentto institutional pluralismin which elites listen and the masses take action.
Bishri consistently has had an almost romantic faith in the perspicacity of the
While providing a lengthy
masses, an instinctive trust in their "healthy instincts.""58
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leaders of all political persuasions-capitalist, corporatist,Nasserist, and Islamistfor having failed to deliver a truly independentsociety whose foundationsare cultural
authenticityand social pluralism.
Unlike Khalaf Allah, Bishri does not systematically comb through the scriptural
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texts to find explanationsfor the ideas and behaviorof the masses. Instead,he emphasizes that social circumstancesconstrainhumanbehavior,and he tends to valorize that
behavior as the key to knowledge about the world. In a word, his is an epistemology
of praxis. Bishri often refers to "reality"(al-wdqi'), and althoughhe does not problematize it, he maintainsthat individualsare social actorswho must understandthis reality
before they can act to promotetheir welfare. The general implicationseems to be that
the masses are the prime actors.
The following reconstructsthe general outlines of Bishri's position. First, he presumably accepts the mainstreamcontractarianview that God offered His covenant to
those who would believe, and they accepted. Second, after Muhammad'sdeath, the
doctrine of the double contract inhered. Third, over historical time the institutional
structuresof the Islamic community became ossified. Fourth, the 18th- and 19thcentury revivalist movements were salutary efforts to restore a healthy balance between knowledge and action because the Muslims then understoodtheir real conditions, broughttheir ideas to bear on their actual realities, and developed their ideas in
directionspermittedby those realities.Fifth, Westernimperialismand the opportunism
of regional elites aborted these movements, which were replaced by state-led reform
in the 19th-20th centuries that created a dualism in society, the hallmarkof which
was the simultaneous existence of Islamic and Western institutions and processes.
This was a recipe for inertia, at best, and failures in distributivejustice, at worst. And
sixth, the only way to resolve society's many problems is throughunity, tolerance of
diversity,and culturalauthenticity.
How did people originally contractto form a human society or community?Bishri
does not say. Before Islam, Arabiansociety was tribally based. How it became so is
of little interest to Bishri. In what way the new Muslim society evolved once it was
formed is also not very clear from his essays. He does say generally that Islam (sic)
put an end to tribal 'casabiyya(roughly, social solidarity, with overtones of clannish
zealotry) and replacedit with a bond of religious affiliation. How did this happen?he
asks. He does not give a direct reply but notes the process ended inter-tribalenmity.
The new communityretainedtribalism'sethos of collectivism and its lineage relationships while smashing its familistic particularism.In his typically abstractlanguage,
Bishri adds:
In this way, factorsof collectivismfollowedthat were mutuallycompatibleand nourishing.
Therewas thusestablishedamongthesefactorsmutualconnectionsandgradualadvancefrom
the particularto the generaluntil mattersreachedthe stageof the greatIslamicsociety....
Fustatin Egypt... aroseas a layoutof landfor troopsfromevery tribe,livingas neighbors
alongsideone another,ratherthandispersedagainstone another,beingunitedby a singleeffort
to spreadthe call of monotheism.59
This propitious beginning did not last. Centuries of stagnation followed until the
18th and 19thcenturies' revivalist movements.Wahhabisin Arabia,Dihlawis in India,
Sanusis in North Africa, and Mahdists in Sudan rose up to end centuries of torpor,
characterizedby blind imitation of 8th- and 9th-centuryjurists.6?In doing so, they
created a new reality, and it is this new reality that is the arena for social contract.
What role do naturallaw and naturalrights play for Bishri? As usual, the picture
is not clear. In his 1972 book on the Egyptian nationalist movement, he rebuts reli-
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gious critics of Egypt's legal system for subordinatingreligious to positive law. Positive law is not the problem, he wrote, and indeed it can be a tool to eliminate the
skewed concentrationof wealth.6'But the connection positive law has with natural
law is disregarded.Later, in his book on the Copts, Bishri makes the national-not
the religious-community the exemplarof humanlife. The ties that bind are territorial
and rooted in Egyptian nationality,a large tent under which Muslims and Copts are
brought together. Left to themselves, the Egyptian people would make this national
communitycohere, using the vehicle of political parties and groups to institutionalize
their presumablycontractualagreements.But unfortunately,he holds, the leaders of
these parties and groups have been the problem. And here, Bishri spreads the blame
aroundequally.
So where do we stand in regardto naturallaw and rights?The role of a continually
intervening God seems to be eclipsed in favor of people acting in history. But are
they autonomous actors because of their rationality?Compared with Khalaf Allah,
Bishri deals much less with reason. This is not to say he disregardsit. On the contrary,
he holds that the only way that Muslims can avoid regressing is to keep open the
gates of independentjudgment and reason (ijtihad).62But whether and how believers
use reason to derive their own identity and their interests remains unexplored.Seemingly, identity and entitlementsbased on it emerge in some elemental way in direct
response to notions of who people think they are; these notions are in turn shaped by
their reality. For example, he writes that Islam was from the very start a doctrine
('aqfda), an association (ribat), a comprehensiveculture embracingmodes of expression, intellectualactivity,organizations,and individualand social conduct.This beginBut did autononing, he notes, "is sound from the point of view of historicalreality."63
mous, free, and rational individuals intentionallybring about this state of affairs? If
so, how?
In a discussion on pluralism in Islam, he writes that Muslims joined groups and
bodies (tawd'ifwa hay'dt).The community'straditionalsocial structurefeaturedvarious similar, cohesive institutions that were founded on concepts and laws that connected prevailing ideas, structures,systems of mutual rights, and duties and norms of
conduct. These social units, such as the extended family, the tribe, the village, the
ward, trade syndicates, professional societies, lodges, schools, and mosques, formed
a stable equilibrium,each unit providinga check on the others.64Meanwhile, he maintains that the interests of the community and the spreadof justice guide the believers
to establish conditions in society that are appropriatefor the principles of Islam.65
But how these interests are formed in the first place is not clear except for general
references to adverse social circumstances and the determinationnot to give in to
Westernimperialism.Ironically,althoughBishri is a historianand repeatedlycalls for
a method of analysis that links thoughtto actual historical circumstances,he does not
show how these thoughts emerge and shape the actions of the people and how those
actions in turn affect the further development of those thoughts. He seems to believe
that it is enough to recapitulatehistorical events and assume that these events shape
consciousness in certain ways at critical historicaljunctures.
Bishri has, however, appealedfor what one might regardas a basis for a new social
contract for Egypt, which he glosses under the rubric of a new "nationalproject."
Egyptiansneed to create a new, dynamic social equilibriumin society. It would reflect

38 ShahroughAkhavi
the properarrangementof power between the state and social forces and among those
social forces themselves. This new equilibriumwould end the zero-sum mentalitythat
characterizesEgyptian politics today, he contends. It would retain the concentration
of power in the community(as againstits state and government?)so thatit can achieve
its goals.66
The so-called national project will be characterizedby "the prevailing political
trend."This seems suggestive of Rousseau's general will. He calls such a trend "the
general frameworkfor the [social] forces of the community,"a frameworkthat embraces these forces yet preserves their plurality and variety. The prevailing political
trend expresses the unity of the community in terms of its overall cultural make-up
without sacrificing the pluralismbespoken by its separateunits. It is a distillation of
"expressivedetails" (mufraddt)of presumablymodem Egyptian social, political, and
cultural movements. Inevitably, these "details"initially are not well integratedwith
one another,and contradictionsmay appearamong them. But a wide-scale debate will
ultimately harmonizethese details, although Bishri is basically silent about how this
might transpire.67Bishri warns that this prevailing trend cannot be "created"out of
whole cloth. It can only be "extracted"from the movement of history and society. It
is reality here that is master,he asserts.68
I have noted that Bishri is basically silent on how the national debate will harmonize the various conflicting preferencesand trends. However, at one juncturehe does
refer to the need to restore what he believes was the integration of religious and
secular sciences in Islam until secularistthought allegedly triumphedin Egypt beginning in the 1920s. This would allow Egyptians to view existential reality with an
Islamic outlook that would link up with rationalism and its method of viewing the
actual world as it is. To succeed, Egyptianswould have to resort to scientific methods
of inquiry,deduction,empirical inquiry,inferring meanings, and discovering the laws
of social change. The process will not be easy and will take at least a generationof
educating youth in these methods "froman Islamic point of view."69
Bishri admits that this is all very abstractbut excuses the abstractionon grounds
thathe wanted the discussion to be general and comprehensive.7"
Ultimately,he seems
to hold that the national project, animatedby the prevailing political trend, must be
the product of a learning process in which people come to understandtheir religious
and social interestsat the same time. In this learningprocess, Egyptianswill not have
to choose between Arabism and Islam. These are predeterminedgivens for them.
Their active choice centers instead on how to integratethem effectively. "In this way
we can operate our will," he says, taking into account the prevailing reality.7'

Fahmi Huwaydi
Fahmi Huwaydi is a journalist and independentscholar who has traveled widely and
writes a weekly column on religion for al-Ahram, Egypt's leading daily. He also has
participatedregularly in colloquia and seminars on culture and religion in the Arab
world and enjoys good relations with the official religious bodies, such as al-Azhar
and the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs. Like Khalaf Allah and Bishri, Huwaydi
is a modernist who believes in the need for renewal of Muslim thought and institu-
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tions. A critic of secularists such as Zaki Najib Mahmudand Fu'ad Zakariyya,he is
also impatientwith the rigid thinking of many Islamists.
Huwaydi's major recent book is Islam and Democracy (1993), which he wrote to
rebut the Islamists' desire to take society back to the 7th century and the secularists'
intentionsto imitate the modernWest.
Huwaydi's work has a numberof implications for social-contracttheory, including
the nobility and privileged station of the human being, who is God's vicegerent on
Earth, entrustedwith its resources and the knowledge needed to put them to proper
use. He cites various Qur'anicverses on these themes, including 17:70, 95:4, 7:11,
and 2:30. From these, he concludes, "Perhaps ...the preservationof the nobility of
the human being.., .is one of the universal objectives of the sharK'ah,such that a
debasement of that nobility would be an abuse of these objectives and an assault on
one of Allah's rights."72
He also notes that differences among people are part of the order of things, citing
various verses, including 11:118, 10:99, and 16:93, which show that God realized that
some people would not believe and He did not want to force the issue.73Huwaydi
wants to demonstratethat Islamic tenets support differences, even though Muslim
practice has often been to fear it and equate it with intrigue and sedition (fitna).74
Huwaydi laments this fear of pluralism in Islamic history and suggests that the
differences can be overcome with persuasion.Persuasion,indeed, is a leitmotif in the
Qur'an,he suggests, a key verse being 41:34. Even when one's enemies reject persuasion, the Qur'anpermits this rejection, he notes, stipulatingverses 18:29, 109:6, and
22:68-69.75 The believers, therefore, accepted the contract offered to them by God.
They saw it as their duty to persuade the unbelievers to enter into the contract, as
well, but when they did not, the believers did not insist. Huwaydi does note that some
disagree with him on this toleranceof the non-believersin the scriptures.He mentions
the PakistanithinkerAbu al-A'la al-Mawdudi(d. 1979) and the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb
(d. 1966) as believing that the verses of the Qur'anthat advise fighting the unbelievers
(9:5, 9:29, and 9:36) supersede those that counsel persuasion. But he stresses that
most interpretersof the Qur'andisagree with such militancy.76
He argues on the authorityof these verses that difference is not to be feared but
embraced.As for the traditionsof the Prophetin which he warned against divisions,
these are not to be taken as admonitionsto create a forced unity of opinions on the
many matters of social relations. They are instead to be read as reproval against
sectarianism,which would destroy the faith.77
Therefore, in Huwaydi's view, people are rational beings who are offered God's
revelation, and it is up to them to accept or refuse. But even those who accept the
revelation may be expected to hold different interpretationsof what jurists call the
"derivativematters"-social, economic, and political activities that have been glossed
under the term "social relations" (mu'amalat). Thus, in the matter of the secondary
contract,the believers are free to organizetheir communitiesthe way they see fit. The
historical record, in Huwaydi's opinion, bears this out. The Islamists' insistence that
"rulebelongs to God alone," citing the so-called sovereignty verses (5:44, 5:45, 5:47,
12:40, and 12:67), have mistranslatedthe word hukmto mean "rule,"whereasit means
"judgment."And they fail to understandthat the verses apply to only devotional
matters,not to social relations.78Today's militant Islamists who are calling for unifor-
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mity in the communityare asking the impossible and are highly unrealistic.He maintains that differences in Islamic history have been important seed beds for renewal
(tajdid) and for the applicationof independentjudgment in mattersof law where the
scripturesare either ambiguous or silent.79
Once they createdtheir community,the Muslims enjoyed the freedom their religion
bestowed on them to create political institutions.In the modern era, says Huwaydi, a
landmarkpolitical institutionis the political party.Muslims are free to create different
political parties."8This is important for him, because the militant Islamist groups
oppose such pluralism, invoking Qur'an5:56 and 58:22, verses that call for victory
for the unique "Party of God" (hizb Allah) against the "Party of Satan" (Q.58:19).
Huwaydi strongly objects to applicationof a 7th-centuryterm to the 20th century and
remindsus that in the Qur'an,the "Partyof God"obviously was meant metaphorically
to refer to Muslims strugglingagainst their enemies. It would be a mistake to say that
hizb Allah in the Prophet'stime referredto a political party as that term is understood
today. Those who say today that one either belongs to hizb Allah or has allied with
the devil are in fact arrogating to themselves the right to pronounce unbelief on
whomever they choose."
Huwaydi approvingly refers to certain remarks made by Tariq al-Bishri, whose
comments on pluralismwere discussed earlier.Speaking in August 1992 at a conference on political pluralismat the Centerfor the Study of Civilizations in Cairo, Bishri
noted that heretoforepluralismwas manifestedin Islam by groups seeking to privilege
their own interpretationsof scripture.Now, though, the issue is the inter-relationship
between the plurality of political organizationsand the interests Egyptians have as
citizens pushing political, economic, and social agendas.82In this pursuit,Huwaydi is
preparedto allow the secularists,including the Marxists,to speak freely and compete
for the people's vote at the ballot box with Muslim modernistsand Islamists,provided
that they do not seek to destroy the foundationsof Islamic belief."3Egyptians of all
persuasionshave the right to oppose the governmentdemocraticallyif they deem its
policies to be in violation of the injunctionto commandthe good and forbid evil (Q.
3:104, 3:110, 3:114, 7:157, 9:71).84 What if the secularistswin the elections? They are
entitled to rule, and if Islamists hold power at the time of these elections, they must
surrenderit.85
Did the believers freely dispose of their own decisions and arrangetheir affairs on
the basis of consultation,justice, freedom, and equality? Huwaydi is not so sure. He
is certain they have the right to do so, but whetherthey have been able to implement
this right is anothermatter.86God gives people the freedom to accept the revelation.
Verses 2:256, 18:29, 17:107, and 10:99 all point to the freedom people have to accept
the true faith. Thus, if people have the freedom to believe or not to believe, they
certainly have the freedom to dispose of their secularmatters,which after all are baser
than the divine revelation.Because Islam's fundamentalprinciple (asl) is the freedom
of the human being as human being, then the derivativeprinciple (far') must be that
they are free to arrangetheir affairs as they see fit.87
Although he stresses that a number of the ulema over the centuries did oppose
oppressive rule, he concedes that their opposition was undercut by fear that direct
challenges to rulers could create chaos, which in turn would mean that the religious
injunctionscould not be implemented.Muslims have been ambivalenttowarddemoc-
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racy and democraticinstitutions,and this is upsetting to Huwaydi, because their position towardit should be positive. He has no problem borrowingthe principle of party
pluralismfrom Westerndemocracy,as long as Muslims can make it conform to their
values and ideals.8 He attributessome of the difficulties of coming to terms with
democracy and supporting it to the "culturalbackwardness"and "backwardnessof
thought" of the Arab Islamic world, although colonialist policies must also figure
prominentlyin this failure.89
Huwaydi declares that the people are guided by seven principlesin establishing the
Islamic state. They are: (1) the religious community (umma) is the master decisionmaker (sdhib al-ikhtiydr);(2) the society is responsible for supervising public interests; (3) the people in society are endowed with freedom; (4) the members of the
society are equal; (5) non-Muslims enjoy "legitimacy";(6) oppression is rejected;
and (7) no one is above the law.90
Huwaydi explicitly takes up the social-contractconcept in regardto the first point,
approvinglyciting the jurist Abu Mansural-Baghdadi (d.1037): "the great masses of
our people have said the way to consolidate [the umma] is by [giving determinative]
choice to it."91On this view, the umma has the right to make the contract('aqd) and
to cancel it.92In practice, it is "the people of loosing and binding" who make the
umma'sdecisions, guided by the interestsof that community.93This is not a recipe for
theocracy,he adds, invoking 'Abduhon this point. "Islam"does not call for a divine
mandateand monopoly of power in the hands of the men of religion. In Islam, religion
is the source of law and values but not the source of power (sulta). Therefore, the
people should "fulfill [their] contracts"and "cooperatewith one anotherin goodness
and piety and not abet each other in crime and rebellion"(Q.5:1, 5:2).94
As it does for Khalaf Allah, consultationconstitutes a very importantpart of Huwaydi's theory of social contract.People consult with one anotherin drawing up this
contract, and the state and the government that it has formed have the mandate to
consult with citizens. The right to be consulted is tantamountto the right to participate
in politics, share in the community'swealth, be entitled to social security,and benefit
from policies of mutual sufficiency.95 Huwaydi makes a highly categorical claim for
the verse, "Their affairs are a matter of counsel" (Q.42:38), asserting that the word
"affairs" is "comprehensive, universal and absolute."96Further, he asserts that,
whereas in the West democracycame into existence after a long struggle of contending groups, shura in Islam was a divine commission from the onset.97 A central idea
of the social contract in Islam is accountability:Islam mandatescalling rulers to account. What is the justification for such a view? Two Qur'anicverses: 11:13 ("Do not
rely on oppressorslest you fall into the fire of hell)," and 18:59 ("We destroyed that
town when they turnedoppressors,making its destructiona promise)."98
Justice, which Huwaydi does not breakout as a separatecategory among the seven
principles that guide people in the constructionof their state, is nevertheless implied
in points four throughseven. Five Qur'anicverses are cited, and he maintainsthat the
justice bespoken in these verses is absolute and the mandateis to abide by it in all
times and places.99He then refers to a famous statementmade by Ibn Taymiyya (d.
1328): "it is said that God makes the just state triumph,even if it be a non-believing
one; and the unjust state fail, even if it be a believing one."'100
Huwaydi admits that somehow the social contracthas not worked well "in the last
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two centuries" insofar as justice is concerned. The "Islamic condition" has been
"asleep" in this "dark fashion," where "rightly-guidedschools of upbringing have
been absent."Violations of justice are due to "anomalies"and are "the fruit of exceptional conditions."However, he holds that any fair-mindedobserverwould agree that
the social contractin Islam does not clash with democracyor with most of the Western
liberal project.1'0Indeed, a major area of similarity between the political theory of
Islam and that of Westernsocieties is the concept of "political contract"('aqd siydst)
between the community and the ruler.Moreover, all the civil rights and liberties detailed in Westernconstitutionsare endorsedin the Islamic tradition,except that, from
the point of view of the origins of these rights, Muslims refer to them as the "rights
of Allah." The fact that Westernpolitical theories do not see these rights as originating
in God does not diminish the fact that human beings are guaranteedthem in Islamic
thought,just as humans are guaranteedthem in Westerntheories.102Explicitly invoking Rousseau's legacy, Huwaydi writes that centuriesbefore the Swiss thinker spoke
of the general will, the Muslims established that the will of the community, as expressed by the jurists' consensus, is inviolable and a source of law.'03

CONCLUSIONS

Khalaf Allah, Bishri, and Huwaydi believe they have vindicated a theory of social
contractin the scripturaltexts and in the actual practice of the early Muslim community (622-61). Yet, despite their efforts to materialize such a theory in early Islam,
they have not shown how believers did or could consciously decide to associate with
one anotherto form a moral communitythat would be the guardianof their individual
interests. Instead,they have inferredthat this must have happened,given the premise
that God's revelation is based on His love and the welfare and prosperity of the
believer, and the people could not but accept this bargain.They deploy concepts such
as consultation,justice, interests, and freedom and discover these as motivatingforces
that broughtthe early Muslims together in the umma.Yet in their writings, the actual
onset of the people's political consciousness and then its evolution is taken for granted
ratherthan problematized.
The society of the contractariantheoristsis civil society. Such a society transforms
individuals who in a state of naturewere amoral, lawless, atomized units into moral
beings. The society of the Muslim contractariansdiscussed here is a religiously based
society, which nevertheless has generated civil institutions, such as courts, legislatures, executives. This society, they argue, is indeed a moral community,pursuingthe
interestsof its citizens. Yet these citizens are not the source of their own trusts,which
they have deposited in these institutionsas expressive mechanisms of their collective
will. Consequently,the argumentsof our writers that sovereignty rests in the nation;
the people have the right to elect their leaders;rulers are accountableto the citizens;
and people fully enjoy civil rights, freedom, justice, and equality seem to derive not
from social-contractpremises but from their belief in the malleability of religious
texts and inferences about the Prophet'sand the early Muslims' behavior in response
to those texts. This is not to suggest that such texts may not be read and interpreted
in a manner that would encourage Muslim conformity with liberal social-contract
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notions. But in the end, these are religious texts that were introducedat a time when
concepts such as popularsovereignty and civil rights were not known.
These writershave not explicitly addressedthe Westerntheorists of social contract,
althoughHuwaydi mentions Rousseau in passing. Their own theories are unsystematically presented,in part because they were not self-consciously situating their thought
in contractariandiscourse. Thus, it is not always clear from reading these works exactly what in Islam constitutes the objectives of the social contract,the natureof the
agency involved in constructingit, the motivations of these agents, and the consequences for non-modernistSunni political theory.Khalaf Allah and Huwaydi suggest
Lockean and Kantianperspectiveson social contract,althoughneitheraccepts Locke's
stress on property,for example, or Locke's and Kant'sbelief that the legislaturein civil
society should advance the interests of the self. Bishri's idea of a general trend that
maintainsthe dynamicequilibriumof society is reminiscentof Rousseau'sgeneralwill.
All three implicitly reject Ash'ari ontology and epistemology, according to which
the reality of the universe is at every moment the consequence of God's continuous
intervention,and the knowledge and acts of human beings are "acquired"from God
precisely at the moment of thinking a particularthought or engaging in a particular
act. This raises questions about how these writers would explain God's withdrawing
from engagement with the natural world once he has created it. None of the three
writers explicitly raises this issue.
In revelation, it is the "rights of Allah" that these authors discuss, but they are
bestowed on human beings as revocable trusts to advance God's purposes. The individual's dependenceon God does not vitiate his or her autonomy or freedom because
Allah has the human being's interests at heart. Yet exactly how people can remain
ultimatelyfree if there is no naturallaw outside the shari'ais left unexamined.Consequently,there is an ad hoc quality to these theorists' claims that humansare absolutely
free, independent,and rationalin their actions in worldly matters.If naturallaw coincides with the divine law in Islam, this means humanbeings cannot understandnatural
law (and hence the operationof the world) throughreason alone.•04 If reason cannot
be sovereign, then room exists for mandates,which of course are not self-evident but
interpretedand imposed on behalf of God by not always benevolent human beings.
All three theorists make it clear that they believe human beings are slaves ('ibad)
of God, because that is central to the immutable doctrine of devotional duties. But
they also agree that the human being is free to violate God's contract, and that God
made the individualin His own image as the noblest of creatures.Over the centuries,
the jurists creatively derived a doctrine to try to resolve this paradox of submission
and freedom. "Thus, while he is an object of imprescriptiblerights on the part of
God, man is the subject of imprescriptiblerights vis-at-visthe world ... [and]has been
granteda free and inviolable juridical personality(dhimma)."'05
Although none of the
three theorists specifically invokes this "inviolablejuridical personality,"each-especially Khalaf Allah and Huwaydi-emphasizes God's appointmentof the human
being as His vicegerent on Earth and hence endowed by implication with this personality.
The concept of naturallaw in the West differs from the Muslim conception. Western
natural-lawdoctrines stress the inherent rationality of the workings of the universe,
that the operation of the physical laws of natureis due to the inherentrationalityof
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this nature.By extension, it emphasizes that human thought and actions are governed
by an inherentrationalitythat is independentof any higher metaphysical force. Huwaydi, without talking in these specific terms, notes that political-partypluralism,a
concomitant of democracy in some interpretationsof that concept, is something that
can be borrowed from the West and adapted to the requirementsof an enlightened
Muslim society. He therefore can be read as expressing an idea rooted in a natural
law that is independentof divine law.
Huwaydi and other modernist Sunni Muslim theorists of social contract have an
opportunityto elaboratefurther on the principle of "inviolablejuridical personality."
In particular,they may be able specifically to engage Ash'arism'srefusal to accommodate itself with an independentdoctrine of naturallaw and naturalrights. That would
mean identifying specifically with traditionsin Islamic philosophy (ratherthan theology andjurisprudence),of course. This need not requireembracinga radical Mu'tazilism, which I believe would be highly unlikely. Instead, it would require working
within a more liberal traditionof Ash'arism.
One may ask how these writersfit into the overall discussion takingplace in Islamic
societies about the future course of politics in the Muslim world. Although that larger
discussion has not been the focus of this paper,it may be said that those arguingthe
need to abandonWesternconceptions face a serious challenge. Bishri's vindicationof
positive law, Huwaydi's insistence on the importanceof party pluralism,and Khalaf
Allah's championingof public opinion and public interest all speak to the importance
of flexibility and adaptabilityfor the development of Muslim political theory. Those
who admire the ideas of Islamist thinkers such as Jalal Kishk or MuhammadalSha'rawiwould probablymore profitablyengage this Neo-Salafi discourse ratherthan
dismiss it out of hand. As noted, Islamists can raise very pointed questions abouthow
the Neo-Salafis propose to remain within the Ashcaritradition,especially on the critical issue of the relationshipbetween naturallaw and divine law. This is likely to be
the area of the most interestingdiscussions in the years ahead in Sunni political and
social theory.
At any rate, the fact is that Sunni modernistsin Egypt, representedby Khalaf Allah,
Bishri, and Huwaydi-who in varying degrees associate with the more liberal trend
in Muhammad'Abduh'sthought-have raised importantissues thatcannot be ignored.
It is an open question whether their conceptions bearing on social contract will ultimately prevail; that will depend in part on actual historical developments in Muslim
societies. Yet as long as they demonstratethe continuities of their ideas with those of
the intellectual traditionof Muhammad'Abduhand Rashid Rida, they will remain a
redoubtablesocial force in Egyptianculture and politics.
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